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The Last-in-Time Marriage
Presumption
PETER NASH SWISHER* and
MELANIE DIANA JONES**
I. Introduction
The typical scenario for the last-in-time marriage presumption is not as
unusual as one might expect: A husband (or wife) has unexpectedly died,
and the bereaved surviving spouse is in the process of bringing a legal proceed-
ing that may include a probate action, a wrongful death action, a suit for social
security benefits, a workers' compensation action, a life insurance action, or
another legal action for related compensatory, probate, or insurance benefits.
However, during the pendency of these actions a former wife comes forward,
claiming that she has never been divorced from her deceased spouse and that
she, rather than the subsequent wife, should recover in any legal proceeding
as the legal wife. Which wife should prevail?
To many, the initial conclusion might be that because American family law
in the vast majority of states prohibits bigamy and other plural marriages,'
the first-in-time spouse should recover all the proceeds. But this conclusion
would be wrong.
The last-in-time marriage presumption is based upon "one of the strongest
presumptions known to the law" that an existing marriage, once shown, is
valid. A subsequent marriage, therefore, raises the very strong presumption
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School.
** Associate, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Tysons Comer, Virginia.
1. See, e.g., Rance v. Rance, 587 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Potter v.
Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying Utah law). See also THE
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 207(a)(1), 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987). See
generally HOMER H. CLARK JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 64-70 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CLARK]; JOHN D. GREGORY, PETER N.
SWISHER& SHERYL L. SCHEIBLE, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 39-40 (1993) [herein-
after UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW].
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that any former marriage was terminated by death, annulment, or divorce.
Once this presumption arises, the former spouse has the burden of proving
that no death, annulment, or divorce occurred to terminate the prior marriage.2
Thus, if the former spouse fails to rebut this last-in-time marriage presumption
by searching all divorce records where the deceased resided, or might reason-
ably have resided, the subsequent spouse will prevail.' This marital presump-
tion is based not upon logical arguments, but upon underlying public policy
arguments, and the last-in-time marriage presumption therefore continues to
be recognized and applied in current judicial decisions as well. 4
Surprisingly, for a presumption that is often characterized as "one of the
strongest known to the law, 5 there has been very little legal analysis regarding
this unique marriage presumption. This article, therefore, analyzes and dis-
cusses the theoretical and practical aspects of the last-in-time marriage pre-
sumption by examining its underlying rationale, and the legal result when the
last-in-time presumption conflicts with other legal presumptions. The article
then discusses the availability and application of the last-in-time marriage
presumption including who can invoke it, when it becomes available, and the
various kinds of legal actions where it may properly be utilized. The article
further addresses burden of proof issues involving the last-in-time marriage
presumption, including the factual elements that must be proven and the stan-
2. See, e.g., Parker v. American Lumber Co., 56 S.E.2d 214, 216 (Va. 1949):
The decided weight of authority, and we think the correct view, is that where
two marriages of the same person are shown, the second marriage is presumed
valid; that such presumption is stronger than and overcomes the presumption of
the continuance of the first marriage, so that a person who attacks a second
marriage has the burden of producing evidence of its invalidity. When both parties
to the first marriage are shown to be living at the time of the second marriage,
it is presumed in favor of the second marriage that the first was dissolved by
divorce. These presumptions arise, it is said, because the law presumes morality
and legitimacy, and not immorality and bastardy.
3. Under the generally prevailing view in most jurisdictions, a prior spouse will
only be able to rebut this last-in-time marriage presumption by searching all of the
divorce records where the deceased spouse resided-or could have resided-in order
to prove that no divorce decree was ever granted to the deceased spouse. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 328 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Hewitt
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1980). However, if
the prior spouse successfully does present evidence that no divorce proceedings were
instituted in any jurisdiction where the deceased spouse might reasonably have pursued
them, then the presumption would be rebutted. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d
603 (Tex. 1975).
4. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pope, 517 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994);
Munson v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 830 (1994) (applying California law); Chandler
v. Central Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649 (Kan. 1993); Leonard v. Leonard, 560 So. 2d
1080 (Ala. Ct. App. 1990).
5. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
See also CLARK, supra note 1, at 71 ("The presumption that the latest of successive
marriages is valid is more important than the other presumptions validating marriage").
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dard and quality of proof which must be established to overcome the presump-
tion. Finally, an analysis of the case of Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company will illustrate the underlying principles, application, and defenses
involving the last-in-time marriage presumption.
II. Legal Bases and Conflicts
The last-in-time marriage presumption6 is a legal theory which allows the
courts to presume that a later in time marriage is a valid marriage whenever
there is a legal conflict with any previous marriage to the same spouse. This
presumption, in reality, is a two-prong presumption. The first prong presumes
that the earlier marriage was terminated by the death of the former spouse.
If the former spouse is shown to be living at the time of the subsequent marriage,
then the second prong presumes that the former marriage was terminated by
divorce or annulment. Once a subsequent marriage is shown, therefore, the
presumption effectively places the burden of proof on the party attacking the
subsequent marriage to prove that the former marriage was not terminated
by death, divorce, or annulment.
A. Public Policy Rationales
The primary reasons supporting the last-in-time marriage presumption his-
torically have been based upon three underlying public policy rationales. These
include the presumptions of innocence, morality, and the legitimacy of off-
spring, all of which favor the parties of the last-in-time marriage since "the
law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage;
legitimacy, and not bastardy."' In other words, the courts will not presume that
6. The courts and commentators have not been uniform in how they have defined
this marital presumption. See, e.g., Annotation, Presumption as to Validity of Second
Marriage, 14 A.L.R.2d 7 (1950) and Later Case Service (defined as a presumption
related to the validity of a second marriage); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 140-149
(1970) (defined as a presumption of the validity of a second or subsequent marriage);
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 43(c)(3) (1948) (defined as a presumption affecting the validity
of conflicting marriages to the same spouse); CLARK, supra note 1, at 71 (defined as
the latest of successive marriages); UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at
35-36 (defined as the last-in-time marriage presumption). Since this presumption is
not limited to a second marriage and may include subsequent or successive marriages,
the term "last-in-time marriage presumption" will be utilized throughout this article
for purposes of convenience and consistency.
7. See, e.g., In re Rash's Estate, 53 P. 312, 313 (Mont. 1898) (citing with
approval Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1885)). See also Pittinger v. Pittinger, 64 P.
195, 197 (Colo. 1901) (stating that the presumption "arises because the law presumes
morality and not immorality, and that every intendment is in favor of matrimony.");
Parker, 56 S.E.2d at 216 (stating that "the law presumes morality and legitimacy,
not immorality and bastardy.").
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the parties would purposefully enter into an existing bigamous or polygamous
marriage or that they would intentionally illegitimatize their children.'
Although the underlying presumptions of innocence and morality are the
most commonly cited rationales for recognizing and enforcing the last-in-time
marriage presumption, 9 a number of courts also recognize the legitimacy of
offspring as another underlying rationale. A Texas court, for example, held
that the presumption of innocence should be recognized in the context of
the last-in-time marriage presumption, "especially when the presumption is
necessary to protect the legitimacy of children."'° However, although this
presumption of legitimacy may be an important underlying factor in invoking
the last-in-time marriage presumption, a New York court held that it was
erroneous to apply the presumption only in those cases where the legitimacy
of offspring of a subsequent marriage was at issue."
8. See, e.g., Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1034 (N.J. 1982) (stating
that the presumption "reflects a belief that parties would not willingly commit bigamy
or illegitimize their children."). See also Rainer v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1977) (stating that the "policies upon which this presumption rests are that
the law presumes innocence, not criminality (bigamy); morality, not immorality; and
marriage, not concubinage.").
See also CLARK, supra note 1, at 71-72:
A careful reading of the numerous cases applying the presumption leaves a very
strong impression that in all probability the prior marriage had not ended, but
that the courts were holding that it must be presumed to have ended for the purpose
of protecting the legitimacy of children or honoring the financial or property
claims of women who had assumed for many years that they were married and
had performed the obligations of marriage. This is another instance of the law's
treating the de facto assumption of the marital status as paramount to compliance
with legal forms.
9. See, e.g., Mayo v. Mayo, 326 S.E.2d 283, 285 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). These
underlying presumptions of innocence and morality, however, are not considered to
be rigid presumptions. See, e.g., Welch v. All Persons, 254 P. 179, 182 (Mont. 1927).
Nevertheless, a majority of courts have found that they "should always be indulged
in passing judgment upon the acts of our fellowman." Fowler v. Texas Exploration
Co., 290 S.W. 818, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
10. Fowler, 290 S.W. at 822. See also Bowman v. Little, 61 A. 223, 225 (Md.
Ct. App. 1905):
After it has been shown that there was an actual marriage, solemnized in the
method which the law prescribes, and followed by birth of issue, every inference
is invoked in support of its validity and against an alleged antecedent marriage,
because the presumptions of the law are always in favor of innocence and legiti-
macy.
See also In re Estate of Pope, 517 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
the last-in-time marriage presumption is particularly strong where children are born
of the later marriage).
11. In re Salvin's Will, 173 N.Y.S. 897 (Surrogate's Ct. Kings Co. 1919). A
more recent case applying New York law, however, has held that the last-in-time
marriage presumption is not as strong in cases where no children are involved. See
Milano v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 586 F. Supp. 1431, 1434 (E.D.N.Y.
1984). But see infra Section II.D.
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In addition to these traditional underlying rationales of innocence, morality,
and legitimacy of offspring, a number of courts and commentators have identi-
fied other important public policy bases underlying and supporting the last-in-
time marriage presumption. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example,
found an important purpose of the last-in-time marriage presumption to be
one of protecting and strengthening the social and moral standards of the
community at large.' 2 Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court stressed an
important need for the presumption in light of an increasing incidence of
divorce and remarriage in order to comport with the reasonable marital expec-
tations of the parties and to lend stability to human affairs. 3 This "reasonable
expectations" underlying rationale for the last-in-time marriage presumption
constitutes another extremely strong public policy argument since the over-
whelming majority of state courts will attempt to validate the parties' reason-
able marital expectations whenever possible. 4 An overwhelming number of
American courts continue to validate the reasonable marital expectations of
the parties whenever possible. 5 One commentator, analyzing the development
of the last-in-time marriage presumption under Georgia law, theorizes that
the presumption achieves socially desirable results by fulfilling the reasonable
12. Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401, 406 (9th Cir. 1957) (interpreting California
law). See also Rainer v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666, 669-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977):
The presumption rests upon strong social policies which give effect to the expecta-
tions of the parties. Parties to a marriage are entitled to a security provided by
the law. The legal premise permits them to assume validity so that they may plan
and order their lives accordingly.
13. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1034 (N.J. 1982).
14. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 31 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Ark. 1930):
Every intendment of the law is in favor of matrimony. When a marriage has been
shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of proof,
the law raises a strong presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden
of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him [or her] throughout, and in
every particular, plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure
of this presumption, that it is illegal and void.
See also McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 21 S.E.2d 761, 765 (Va. 1945):
[I]n the interest of morality and decency the law presumes marriage between a
man and a woman when they lived together as man and wife, demeaning themselves
toward each other as such, and that status in society is recognized by their friends
and relatives. While it is true, however, that cohabitation and repute do not consti-
tute marriage, they do constitute strong evidence tending to raise a presumption of
marriage, and the burden is on him who denies the marriage to offer countervailing
evidence. See also Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D.
Wyo. 1985) (stating the last-in-time marriage presumption is especially strong
since public policy favors reliance on the validity of marital relationships).
15. See generally UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at 26-27 (formal
statutory marriages], 27-29 [informal common law marriages], 47 [marital conflict of
laws issues]. See also CLARK, supra note 1, at 40:
[T]he cases find the policy favoring valid marriages sufficiently strong to justify
upholding [certain defective marriages]. This seems the correct result. Most such
cases arise long after the parties have acted upon the assumption that they are
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expectations of the parties and by protecting apparent spouses in economically
vulnerable positions from becoming welfare recipients. 16 Arguably, then, this
underlying public policy rationale of validating the existing marital expecta-
tions of the parties is just as strong a public policy basis for validating the
last-in-time marriage presumption as the underlying public policy bases of
innocence and morality.
Although legitimacy of offspring is no longer as important a public policy
argument as it once was due to subsequent statutory developments, 17 the interre-
lated public policy rationales of innocence and morality, validating the reason-
able expectations of the parties, and strengthening and stabilizing the social
and moral standards of the community still remain strong and viable underlying
public policy bases for the last-in-time marriage presumption.
B. Recognition of the Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption
Based upon a number of strong and persuasive underlying public policy
rationales, the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions18 continue to
married, and no useful purpose is served by avoiding the long-standing relation-
ship. . . . The same policy of upholding marriages [in general] underlies the
presumption of validity of second marriages....
16. See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Repeal of the Presumption of the Validity of Subse-
quent Marriages: Another Irrational Step Toward Increasing the Welfare Roles, 21
MERCER L. REV. 465, 467 (1970) [hereinafter Taylor].
17. Almost every American jurisdiction has now enacted a state statute legitimizing
children of void or voidable marriages, so this public policy basis for the last-in-time
marriage presumption is not as compelling as it once was. See generally HARRY D.
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 19-20 (1971) (listing these state
statutes). See also UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 9A U.L.A. 587 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Lockett v. Coleman, 308 So. 2d 689 (Ala. 1975); Wilson v. Wilson,
399 P.2d 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Cole v. Cole, 462 S.W.2d 213 (Ark. 1971);
Vargas v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Gainey v. Flemming,
279 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1960) (applying Colo. law); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Manning, 568 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying Conn. law); Williamson v. William-
son, 104 A.2d 463 (Del. 1954); Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992 (D.C. Ct. App.
1977); In re Estate of Lee, 360 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Application
of Tomasa Ragrag Soriano, 35 Haw. 756 (1940); Nicholas v. Idaho Power Co., 125
P.2d 321 (Idaho 1942); Baer v. De Berry, 175 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. Ct. App. 1961); Ross
v. Red Cab Co., 14 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 1938); Miller v. Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., 328 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Harper v. Dupree, 345 P.2d 644
(Kan. 1959); Rose v. Rose, 118 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1938); Zanders v. Zanders, 434
So. 2d 1213 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Browning v. Browning, 168 A.2d 506 (Md. 1961);
In re Adams' Estate, 107 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. 1961); Smith v. Weir, 387 So. 2d 761
(Miss. 1980); Estate of Holloway v. Whitaker, 679 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Crosby v. Ellsworth, 431 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying Montana law); Villalon
v. Bowen, 273 P.2d 409 (Nev. 1954); Raspa v. Raspa, 504 A.2d 683 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1985); Allen v. Allen, 651 P.2d 1296 (N.M. 1982); Fishman v. Fishman, 369
N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 1975); Stewart v. Rogers, 133 S.E.2d 155 (N.C. 1963);
Norton v. Coffield, 357 P.2d 434 (Okla. 1960); Smith v. Smith, 131 P.2d 447 (Or.
1942); Commonwealth ex rel. Alexander v. Alexander, 284 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1971);
Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 314 S.E.2d 16 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Troxel v. Jones, 322
S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Elder, 282 S.W.2d
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recognize and apply the last-in-time marriage presumption. This presumption,
however, has not been universally accepted, and a small minority of states
have rejected the presumption in whole or in part. For example, the Ohio
Supreme Court, while conceding that a large number of states do in fact
recognize the last-in-time marriage presumption, nevertheless held that a
"more reasonable" approach was to place the burden of proof on the subse-
quent spouse, rather than on the prior spouse, by recognizing the conflicting
presumption of the continuation of a prior marriage as a superior presump-
tion. 9 The court gave three reasons as to why it was more appropriate to
place the burden of proof on the subsequent, rather than on the prior, spouse.
First, the court found it was not possible for the prior wife to follow the
recreant husband all over the country, or all over the world, in order to prevent
a subsequent unlawful marriage.20 Second, the court held that it was within
the power of the later or subsequent wife to make adequate inquiry into the
past life of her future husband. 2' Third, the court stated that a presumption
should not be recognized that would "further augment the much-discussed
divorce evil" or encourage marriage between "comparative strangers" with-
out any inquiry into their past lives.22
Wisconsin also has refused to give any special recognition to the last-in-time
marriage presumption. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that no absolute
presumption of Wisconsin law recognizing a subsequent or last-in-time mar-
riage was warranted. 23 The court opined that each case should be decided
upon its own particular facts and circumstances and upon any other inferences
that could fairly be drawn from those facts and circumstances.24
Massachusetts, likewise, has rejected any special application of the last-in-
time marriage presumption. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
held that the last-in-time marriage presumption will only be applied in a situa-
tion where no extrinsic evidence is presented either way. 25 But once a subse-
quent marriage is attacked and impeaching evidence is introduced, the validity
of the last-in-time marriage becomes only "a question of fact to be proved in
371 (Tex. 1955); Martin v. Martin, 510 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1973); DeRyder v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 145 S.E.2d 177 (Va. 1965); Davis v. Davis, 101 P.2d 313 (Wash.
1940); Meade v. State Compensation Comm'r, 125 S.E.2d 771 (W.Va. 1962); and
Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221 (D.Wyo. 1985) (applying Wyoming
law).
19. Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Dell, 135 N.E. 669, 673-74 (Ohio 1922).
The presumption of the continuance of a marriage presumes that a marriage, once
properly and legally solemnized, continues until terminated by death or divorce. Id.
This rejection of the last-in-time marriage presumption in favor of the continuance of
a prior marriage presumption has been followed by later Ohio courts as well. See,
e.g., Dibble v. Dibble, 100 N.E.2d 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
20. 135 N.E. at 674.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Williams v. Williams, 23 N.W. 110, 114 (Wis. 1885).
24. Id.
25. Turner v. Williams, 89 N.E. 110 (Mass. 1909).
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the light of all the circumstances and reasonable inferences arising therefrom,
regardless of the presumptions of innocence, or the death or divorce of one
of the parties to the prior marriage, in order to support the second one.',
2 6
Finally, the Georgia courts have found that the last-in-time marriage pre-
sumption has been largely nullified by a Georgia state statute27 which holds
that the presumption only exists until the former marriage is established, and
the former spouse is shown to be living at the time of the subsequent marriage.
Once these facts have been demonstrated, the burden of proof then shifts to
the party who is claiming the validity of the subsequent marriage to prove
that a divorce was in fact obtained prior to the subsequent marriage.28
Nevertheless, with all due respect to these judicial and statutory precedents,
none of them have adequately addressed-nor have they persuasively rebut-
ted-the important underlying bases for the last-in-time marriage presumption
including: the presumptions of innocence and morality, the legitimacy of chil-
dren, validating the reasonable marital expectations of the parties, strengthen-
ing the social and moral standards of the community at large, and lending
predictability and stability to marital affairs. Accordingly, these five public
policy arguments still remain as viable and persuasive underlying bases for
the last-in-time marriage presumption, in spite of the short-sighted and unper-
suasive approaches taken by a small minority of courts to the contrary.
C. Strength of the Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption
The last-in-time marriage presumption is often described as a very strong
presumption, and numerous courts have called it "one of the strongest pre-
sumptions known to the law. 29 However, the courts have also stressed that
26. Id. at 111. The court went on to state that in Massachusetts law "jealously
regards the marriage relation and makes reasonable assumptions in its favor, but it
has no special regard for second in preference marriages. . . .There is no 'sacramental
force' in the presumption of innocence over the presumption of the continuation of
life or any other [marital presumption]." Id. at 112.
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2(3) (1982).
28. See Glover v. Glover, 322 S.E.2d 755, 756-757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). The
enactment of this Georgia statute, however, has been severely criticized. See Taylor,
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987);
McKnight v. Schweiker, 516 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (D. Md. 1981); Mayo v. Ford,
184 A.2d 38, 41 (D.C. App. Ct. 1962); Anderson v. Anderson, 240 P.2d 966, 968
(Utah, 1952). See also Clark v. Clark, 719 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986).
But see Panzer v. Panzer, 528 P.2d 888, 891 (N.M. 1974):
It is ... inappropriate to categorize the strength of the presumption of validity
of a [subsequent] marriage as being "strong", "very strong", "extremely
strong", or "one of the strongest known to the law".... Such statements are
a confusing blend of two concepts, viz: which party has the burden of proof and
the quantum of proof necessary to carry it.
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the last-in-time marriage presumption is rebuttable rather than a conclusive,3°
and therefore should not be applied to reach a strained result.3' On the other
hand, these same courts continue to emphasize that a last-in-time marriage
presumption grows even stronger with the passage of years,32 and with the
birth of subsequent children. 3
For example, one court held that the presumption of the validity of a last-in-
time marriage should be upheld when the equities weighed in its favor; and
in discussing what equities should be considered, the court found the duration
of the subsequent marriage and the birth of children within that marriage to
be particularly relevant factors. 34 Likewise, a Washington court reiterated
that although the last-in-time marriage presumption grows stronger with each
passing year, nonetheless it is not conclusive and is still capable of being
overcome by contrary evidence.35
D. Conflicts with Other Marital Presumptions
There are two counter-presumptions that often arise and come into conflict
with the last-in-time marriage presumption: (1) the presumption that a mar-
riage, once established, is presumed to continue, and (2) the presumption that
a former spouse remains alive in the absence of contrary evidence. Generally, it
appears that the last-in-time marriage presumption will prevail over both of
these conflicting counter-presumptions.
30. See, e.g., DeRyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 S.E.2d 177, 181 (Va.
1965) (... presumption ... may be rebutted by evidence of invalidating facts); Walsh
v. Walsh, 255 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (the presumption . . . is
rebuttable, and the burden is placed upon the person attacking its validity); Villalon v.
Bowen, 273 P.2d 409, 413 (Nev. 1954) (the presumption of the validity of a subsequent
marriage, however strong, is still rebuttable); Rainer v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666, 669
(Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (the presumption is rebuttable and not conclusive).
31. See, e.g., Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 320 (Ala. 1985):
The presumption of the dissolution of a prior marriage, whether by death or
divorce, should be indulged with caution. We apprehend that such presumptions
sometimes have been made with very little justification. A rule of law which
allows an artificial or technical force to be given evidence which warrants such
presumptions, beyond its natural tendencies to convince the mind, and requires
courts and juries to presume as true what is false, cannot but be fraught with
dangerous consequences.
32. See, e.g., Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Wyo.
1985) (stating that after a passage of many years, the presumption is especially strong
since public policy favors reliance on the validity of marital relationships).
33. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pope, 517 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that this presumption is particularly strong where there are children born of
the later marriage).
34. Boyd v. Heckler, 588 F. Supp. 31, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Milano v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 586 F.Supp. 1431, 1434 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting
that the presumption is not as strong in cases where no children are involved).
35. Estate of Grauel, 425 P.2d 644, 645 (Wash. 1967).
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The vast majority of courts hold that the last-in-time marriage presumption
will always prevail over the presumption of the continuance of a former mar-
riage .36 The underlying reason is that "the presumption of innocence, morality,
and legitimacy will counterbalance and preponderate against the presumption
of former [marital] relations."- 37
On the other hand, several courts have been wary of adopting a blanket
per se rule that the last-in-time marriage presumption will always outweigh
the presumption of the continuance of a former marriage. For example, in In
re Estate of Watt,38 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the last-in-time
marriage presumption "standing alone" should not be able to destroy the
presumption of the continuance of an existing marriage without proof of addi-
tional facts and circumstances supporting the last-in-time marriage presump-
tion and detrimental to the presumption of the continuance of a former mar-
riage. 39 Thus, in a later case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the
following:
On the one hand, with reference to the first marriage ... the law presumes
that it continues until the death of one of the parties or a divorce. On the
other hand, the law recognizes the presumption of innocence in contracting
a second marriage, as well as a presumption of the validity of the second
marriage. In Watts Estate [185 A.2d 781 (Pa. 1962)] we stated that the
second presumption, in itself, does not overcome the first presumption, but
that "[t]he real thrust of the several presumptions is to place the burden
of proving the invalidity of the second marriage upon the person who claims
such invalidity and to require proof of some nature that the first marriage
was not dissolved by death or divorce at the time of the second marriage" .40
36. See, e.g., Chandler v. Cent. Oil Corp. Inc., 853 P.2d 649 (Kan. 1993) (holding
that the last-in-time marriage presumption is stronger than and overcomes or rebuts
the presumption of the continuance of the previous marriage). See also In re Winder's
Estate, 219 P.2d 18, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); In re Adams Estate, 107 N.W.2d 764,
766 (Mich. 1961); Ellis v. Ellis, 277 So. 2d 102, 103 (Ala. Ct. App. 1973); Denson
v. C.R. Fish Grading Co., 220 S.E.2d 217, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); Anderson v.
Anderson, 240 P.2d 966, 968 (Utah, 1952); Meade v. State Compensation Comm'r,
125 S.E.2d 771, 775-776 (W.Va. 1962).
37. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Alexander, 3 So. 2d 46, 48 (Ala. 1941).
See also Mayo v. Mayo, 326 S.E.2d 283, 285 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
38. 185 A.2d 781 (Pa. 1962).
39. Id. at 785-86 (citing Madison v. Lewis, 185 A.2d 357, 360 (Md. Ct. App.
1962)). Additional facts and circumstances which the court thought compelling in-
cluded: (1) a long lapse of time, (2) children born to the later marriage, (3) the
remarriage of the former spouse, and (4) the recognition by the decedent spouse of
the validity of the subsequent marriage. Id. The court feared that always recognizing
the last-in-time presumption as a per se rule over the presumption of the continuance
of a prior marriage might result in a method "of validating every case of meretricious
relations." Id.
40. Commonwealth ex rel. Alexander v. Alexander 284 A.2d 721, 723-24 (Pa.
1971).
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A similar view was expressed by a New York surrogate court, which held
that the conflicting presumptions of the last-in-time marriage presumption
and the presumption of the continuation of a former marriage were of equal
strength-and in effect neutralized one another-leaving the burden of proof
on the parties to further demonstrate the validity or invalidity of the subsequent
marriage.4 ' The court did concede, however, that "the fact of a long separation
conjugally of the parties of the first marriage and a long continued cohabitation
following the later marriage [will be considered] of great weight in favor of
the presumption of validity of the later marriage.' 41
These concerns expressed by the Pennsylvania and New York courts,
however, are more apparent than real. In the vast number of legal disputes
involving the last-in-time marriage presumption, cohabitation with the for-
mer spouse has in fact ceased, and a continuous cohabitation with the subse-
quent spouse has in fact occurred. Hence, the so-called "additional" factual
requirements of cohabitation with the subsequent spouse and recognition
of the subsequent marriage by the decedent spouse are almost always present
within those judicial decisions where the last-in-time marriage presumption
is applied as a per se rule over the presumption of the continuance of a
former marriage. Under either evidentiary rule, therefore, the last-in-time
marriage presumption would still prevail over the presumption of the contin-
uation of a former marriage.
The presumption that a former spouse remains alive is also generally over-
come by the last-in-time marriage presumption whenever these two presump-
tions conflict. 43 Essentially the preponderance of the last-in-time marriage
presumption is aided by a legal presumption recognized in many states that
a former spouse's life continues until seven years have elapsed after a person
was last heard from. 44 However, once again, this is not a conclusive presump-
tion, particularly in the face of conflicting evidence.45
Although seven years normally must elapse before the presumption of death
arises, the courts have held that no inference or presumption arises as to
when-within the seven year period-the death actually occurred. This concept
becomes especially important when the subsequent marriage was entered into
prior to the conclusion of the seven-year period. In such a situation, the stronger
41. Application of Carr, 134 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517-18 (Surrogate's Ct. Chautaqua
Co. 1953).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Summers, 645 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. 1983); In re
Estate of Steinberg, 578 P.2d 487 (Or. 1978); Meade v. State Compensation Comm'r,
125 S.E.2d 771 (W.Va. 1962); Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221 (D.
Wyo. 1985).
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Fuller, 115 N.W. 912, 915 (Iowa 1908); In re McCausland's
Estate, 62 A. 780, 781 (Pa. 1906). See also Stamper v. Stanwood, 159 N.E.2d 865
(Mass. 1959); Cann v. Cann, 632 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
45. See, e.g., Tyll v. Keller, 120 A. 6, 7 (N.J. Ct. App. 1923). See also In re
Watt's Estate, 185 A.2d 781 (Pa. 1962).
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presumptions of innocence and morality will support the legal theory that the
former spouse's death occurred before the subsequent marriage.46
Finally, although not constituting a legal presumption, there exists a proce-
dural rule in almost all American states that a defendant in a divorce action
must be provided with due process notice of any pending divorce action.47 A
former spouse might therefore argue that the lack of any such due process
notice relating to an alleged divorce should also rebut the last-in-time marriage
presumption. However, the last-in-time marriage presumption has been held
to be strong enough to prevail even over this strict due process notice require-
ment. For example, the Florida Supreme Court held that although the former
wife had never been served with divorce papers,48 the subsequent wife never-
theless prevailed based upon the last-in-time marriage presumption. The court
stated:
While the alleged first wife is not required to eliminate every remote possibil-
ity that a divorce might have been secured by her husband, it is necessary
that she tender evidence which when weighed collectively establishes the
absence of a reasonable probability that her husband actually secured the
divorce.49
Likewise, a Michigan appellate court held that "the presumption is not rebutted
by testimony of the first spouse that, to the best of her knowledge, her husband
never attempted to procure a divorce from her, and that she had never received
or had been served with divorce papers.50
46. See, e.g., Tyll v. Keller, 120 A. 6, 7 (N.J. Ct. App. 1923) (stating that where
the presumption of continued life would render a party guilty of bigamy and stamp a
child as illegitimate, then the presumptions of innocence and morality will overcome
the presumption of continued life of the former spouse, even though the seven-year
period has not elapsed). See also Hunter v. Hunter, 43 P. 756, 757 (Cal. 1896); Gilpin
v. Gilpin, 105 N.Y.S.2d 170, 173 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1951); Anderson v. Anderson,
240 P.2d 966, 968 (Utah, 1952).
47. Due process requires that service of process on the defendant in a divorce
action be made in strict compliance with state statutes. If the defendant is not properly
served in a manner reasonably calculated to give notice, the divorce may be attacked
and invalidated for lack of adequate notice. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, at421-422;
UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at 204.
48. Teel v. Nolen Brown Motors, Inc., 93 So. 2d 874, 875 (Fla. 1957).
49. 93 So. 2d at 876.
50. In re Estate of Pope, 517 N.W.2d 281, 282 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (citing
with approval In re Williams Estate, 417 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)). See
also In re Estate of Borneman, 96 P.2d 182 (Cal. 1939); Jackson v. Jackson, 275 So.
2d 683 (Ala. Ct. App. 1973); Rainier v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977);
In re Booker's Estate, 557 P.2d 248 (Ore. Ct. App. 1976). See also CLARK, supra
note 1, at 74, indicating that there is general agreement that
the testimony by one spouse that he never got a divorce himself, that he never
received service or notice of divorce proceedings by the other spouse, and that
he never was guilty of conduct which would be grounds for divorce is not sufficient
to rebut the presumption.
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III. Availability of the Presumption
A. Who May Invoke the Presumption?
In general, the last-in-time marriage presumption may be invoked by the
innocent spouse of the later marriage. This general rule is based upon the
rationale that it is more equitable to require an attacking party to prove the
invalidity of the later marriage, rather than place the burden on the innocent
subsequent spouse to validate the later marriage. 5' Whether a party is innocent
or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
and key issues might include whether or not a party married in good faith
and whether or not such party had the means to affirmatively prove or disprove
the dissolution of the prior marriage.52
On the other hand, the last-in-time marriage presumption will be denied to
any party who deserted or abandoned a prior spouse and who remarried a subse-
quent spouse in bad faith, having no reason to believe that the first marriage had
been legally dissolved. If such a party was found to have remarried in bad faith,
then the presumption cannot be invoked by that party, and the burden would
remain on the party defending the validity of the second marriage to prove that
the first marriage was in fact terminated by death, divorce, or annulment. 53 A
last-in-time marriage presumption also will not arise when the circumstances of
the subsequent marriage give rise to an inference of duress or mental incapacity
on the part of the subsequent spouse, 4 nor in those circumstances where the
parties are before the court and are in a unique position to know whether or not
the former marriage was actually terminated by death or divorce.55
B. When the Presumption Becomes Available
As a general rule, the last-in-time marriage presumption becomes available
once the innocent spouse defending the validity of the subsequent marriage
51. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp. 1358, 1364
n.14 (E.D. Va. 1980). See also Pittinger v. Pittinger, 64 P. 195, 197 (Colo. 1901)(holding that the presumption of the validity of a subsequent marriage applies with
particular force in favor of one who is unable to prove affirmatively that the man she
married in good faith was divorced from a former wife).
52. See, e.g., Lampkin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 52 P. 1040 (Colo. Ct. App. 1898).
See also Succession of City v. Succession of Manuel, 469 So. 2d 467 (La. Ct. App.
1985).
53. See, e.g., Lands v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 120 So. 2d 74, 77 (La.
1960); Brantley v. Skeens, 266 F.2d 447,452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See also Succession
of City v. Succession of Manuel, 469 So. 2d 467 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
the last-in-time marriage presumption would not run in favor of a spouse who had a
prior undissolved marriage unless that spouse could show good faith in contracting
the marriage; however, the innocent spouse of a subsequent marriage would still be
entitled to rely on the validity of the presumption).
54. See, e.g., Christy v. Clarke, 45 Barb. Ch. 529 (N.Y. Ch. 1866).
55. See, e.g., Bancroft v. Brancroft, 50 P.2d 465, 468-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935)(implying that the presumption is not available when a party before the court has unique
information within his own knowledge, and knew or should have known when and
where the alleged divorce took place).
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establishes the existence of that marriage.5 6 Most courts agree that once this
subsequent marriage is shown to exist, the last-in-time marriage presumption
may then be invoked, and the subsequent marriage is presumed to be legally
valid. 57 This in turn would shift the burden of proof on to the party attacking
the validity of the subsequent marriage to prove that an earlier marriage existed
and was not terminated by death or divorce.' s
The courts in Iowa, however, follow an ill-reasoned minority approach
that requires an additional showing of inconsistent conduct by both parties
of the first marriage before the last-in-time marriage presumption may be
invoked. This unwarranted evidentiary rule, popularly known as the "Iowa
Doctrine," requires that in addition to proof of the existence of a subsequent
marriage, "[t]here must be something based on the acts and conduct of
both parties [of the prior marriage] inconsistent with the continuation of
[that] marriage relation before the presumption should be indulged."- 59
Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the last-in-time marriage presump-
tion would only be applicable in situations such as where the parties to the
second marriage lived as husband and wife in the same locality as the first
wife, where they were acquainted with each other, and where no protest
or complaint was ever made by the first wife.' The "Iowa Doctrine" has
not been adopted in the vast majority of American jurisdictions since it
56. See, e.g., Mayo v. Mayo, 326 S.E.2d 283, 286 (N.C. 1985); Yarbrough v.
Yarbrough, 314 S.E.2d 16, 18 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
57. See, e.g., Kearney v. Thomas, 33 S.E.2d 871, 876 (N.C. 1945).
58. See, e.g., Mayo, 326 S.E.2d at 286; Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
490 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (E.D. Va. 1980).
59. See Ellis v. Ellis, 13 N.W. 65, 66 (Iowa 1882). In Ellis, the husband left his
first wife to "go west" and seek his fortune. He continued to correspond with his
first wife, and in his correspondence he treated their marital relationship as continuing.
The first wife therefore had no cause to believe that her husband had divorced her,
and she was not aware that he had contracted a second marriage until after his death.
Since the plaintiffs first wife did not have actual knowledge of the decedent's subse-
quent marriage and cohabitation and because the decedent treated the marital relation-
ship with his first wife as continuing, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the facts and
circumstances were insufficient to invoke the last-in-time marriage presumption, and
declared the first wife as the decedent's lawful widow, rather than the subsequent
wife. Id. See also Gilman v. Sheets, 43 N.W. 299 (Iowa 1889) (again holding under
the Iowa Doctrine that there must be something based on the acts and conduct of both
parties to the first marriage inconsistent with the continuance of the marriage relation
before the last-in-time presumption should be recognized).
60. Leach v. Hall, 64 N.W. 790 (Iowa 1895). Thus, while the acts of only one
party to the first marriage may not be enough to warrant a presumption of divorce
under the last-in-time marriage presumption, at least according to the "Iowa Doctrine,"
when the acts of both parties are inconsistent with the continuance of the prior marriage,
then the last-in-time marriage presumption may be invoked. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raish,
90 N.W. 66 (1902). See also Eygabrood v. Gruis, 79 N.W.2d 215, 217-218 (Iowa
1956) (the last-in-time marriage presumption was applied since both of the parties of
the former marriage subsequently remarried other spouses).
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effectively negates most of the important underlying public policy argu-
ments supporting the last-in-time presumption.
Not surprisingly, subsequent Iowa courts have attempted to temper and
broaden the scope of this doctrine. For example, it may be argued that the
"Iowa Doctrine" is now limited only to legal disputes involving a claim by
the first wife to her husband's property-and that the "Iowa Doctrine" would
have no application in other legal disputes or claims-such as a dispute involv-
ing the decedent husband's life insurance benefits. 6'
In recent years the "Iowa Doctrine" may have been subject to a more
liberal interpretation and application by the Iowa courts. For example, in the
1982 case of Miller v. AMF Harley-Davidson Motor Co. ,62 an Iowa appellate
court held, according to the traditional majority view, that:
The rule in Iowa is that where there are supposedly conflicting marriages
of the same spouse, the presumption of validity operates in favor of the
second marriage, and the party attacking the second marriage has the burden
of proving its invalidity and of showing a valid prior marriage; and where
a valid prior marriage is shown, it is presumed to have been dissolved by
divorce or death so that the attacking party has the burden of adducing
evidence to the contrary. . . . This is so whenever there are facts consisting
of acts or conduct of both parties upon which the presumption can be legiti-
mately founded.63
But what exactly constituted such "acts or conduct" of both parties to the
prior marriage in Miller which allowed the last-in-time marriage presumption
to become effective? In this case there were no inconsistent acts or conduct
on the part of the prior wife. Instead, it was the attorneys for the defendant
Harley-Davidson who searched the divorce records in California in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption under Iowa
law. 64 Moreover, the Miller dispute involved a personal injury action by the
subsequent spouse against a third-party tortfeasor, rather than a property action
by the prior spouse against the decedent husband's estate. Thus, the minority
"Iowa Doctrine" as it relates to the availability of the last-in-time marriage
presumption remains an unpersuasive and insupportable legal doctrine riddled
with judicial inconsistencies which most American courts have wisely
refrained from adopting.
61. See, e.g., Parsons v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 78 N.W. 676 (Iowa 1899)(applying the last-in-time marriage presumption, and holding for the subsequent wife
in a dispute with the insurance company, by distinguishing the Ellis case as only
applying when the prior wife was making a claim on the husband's property). However,
with probate claims or other property rights, if the prior wife believed in good faith
that she was still married to the decedent husband, and conducted herself according
to that belief, then the Iowa Doctrine as enunciated in the Ellis case would still be
applicable. See, e.g., In re Estate of Weems, 139 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Iowa 1966).
62. 328 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
63. Id. at 351.
64. Id. at 352.
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A second minority approach is the so-called "California Rule." Although
California courts recognize the last-in-time marriage presumption,65 once a
prior spouse presents evidence of a valid marriage, the burden of proof appar-
ently then shifts to the subsequent spouse to prove that the prior marriage was
invalid or was terminated by death or divorce. For example, in the case of
Tatum v. Tatum,66 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, purportedly applying
California law, disagreed with the subsequent spouse that the availability of
the last-in-time marriage presumption always places the burden of proof on
a former spouse to demonstrate by strong and convincing evidence that the
prior marriage was not dissolved by death or divorce as recognized in the
vast majority of American jurisdictions today.67 Instead, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated:
It is further argued that appellees [who were upholding the validity of the
prior marriage] were required to negative all possible defects which would
render the first marriage invalid. . . . Indeed, it appears that the California
rule is just the contrary; that is, despite the strength of the presumption of
the validity of the later marriage, it merely requires the advocate of a prior
marriage to establish by competent evidence a prima facie case of a regularly
solemnized marriage. . . . Then with two presumptively valid marriages
in existence, the ultimate burden rests on the party who advocates the second
marriage to prove the invalidity of the first.68
There are two major problems with this so-called "California Rule" as
enunciated by the Tatum court. First, a careful reading of California precedent
cited as supporting authority by the Tatum court69 does not expressly support
the Tatum rule of "merely requiring" that the prior spouse establish the validity
of the first marriage in order to shift the burden of proof on to the subsequent
65. See, e.g., In re Smith's Estate, 201 P.2d 539, 540 (Cal. 1949):
It is well established that when a person has entered into two successive marriages,
a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the
burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that
the first marriage had not been dissolved by the death of the spouse or by divorce
or had not been annulled at the time of the second marriage.
66. 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957) (applying Cal. law).
67. See, e.g., Mayo v. Ford, 184 A.2d 38,41 (D.C. Ct. App. 1962) (the presump-
tion favoring the validity of the subsequent marriage is one of the strongest known to the
law, and while not conclusive, can only be rebutted by strong, distinct, and conclusive
evidence); Minter v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 97 A.2d 715, 717-18 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1953) (the presumption of validity of the subsequent marriage can only be overcome
by clear and convincing proof); Williamson v. Williamson, 104 A.2d 463, 464 (Del.
1954) (the presumption of the validity of the subsequent marriage is so strong that
proof of a former subsisting marriage, in order to overcome the presumption, must
be so cogent and conclusive as to fairly preclude any other result). See generally infra
Section IV.
68. Tatum, 241 F.2d at 406.
69. See Hunter v. Hunter, 43 P. 756 (Cal. 1896), and In re the Estate of Smith,
201 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1949).
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spouse.70 Moreover, a number of other California decisions have expressly
held contra to this so-called "California Rule." For example, a California
appellate court held that:
In the case of conflicting marriages of the same person, the presumption
of validity operates in favor of the second marriage. Accordingly, the burden
of showing the validity of the first marriage is on the party asserting it,
and even when this is established it may be presumed in favor of the second
marriage that at the time thereof the first marriage had been dissolved either
by a decree of divorce or by the death of the former spouse, so as to cast
the burden of adducing evidence to the contrary on the party attacking the
second marriage.7
Likewise, another California court also held that the mere proof of a prior
marriage was not sufficient to make a case against a second ceremonial mar-
riage.
7 2
Arguably, then, the Tatum court may have seriously misstated the actual
"California Rule" regarding the availability of the last-in-time marriage pre-
sumption. However, assuming arguendo that Tatum correctly states the "Cali-
fornia Rule," Tatum's underlying public policy rationale still remains unper-
suasive for the same reasons as the "Iowa Doctrine," and thus, the Tatum
approach also has been wisely rejected by the majority of American jurisdic-
tions.
70. For example, the Tatum court only cited to "Hunter, supra" without any
specific page reference to the actual Hunter case. In fact, nowherein the Hunter decision
is there any express mention of this so-called holding. Instead, the Hunter court held:
"A more correct statement perhaps would be that the burden is cast on the party
asserting guilt or immorality [i.e., the prior wife] to prove the negative-that the first
marriage has not ended before the second marriage." Hunter v. Hunter, 43 P. 756,
757 (Cal. 1896).
Likewise, in Smith, the prior wife did more than merely show evidence of a valid
former marriage. She searched the divorce records in both San Francisco and Los
Angeles and was unable to find any record of divorce dissolving the marriage. Thus,
the trial court "could reasonably infer" that had a divorce been granted, "such a
decree would have been discovered in the search of the records of the various counties
of the state." In re Smith's Estate, 201 P.2d at 540-541. So clearly, these two cases
do not support the broad burden of proof assumptions made by the Tatum court.
71. In re Borneman's Estate, 96 P.2d 182, 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939) (emphasis
added) (citing with approval 38 CAL. JUR. 1328).
72. Marsh v. Marsh, 250 P. 411, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926). The Marsh court
continued:
It has been stated time and again by the Supreme Court of this state that mere
proof of a prior marriage and the continued life of both spouses is not sufficient
to make a case against a second ceremonial marriage-that there must be afurther
showing that the first marriage has not been set aside by judicial decree.
Id. at 413. See also In re Winder's Estate, 219 P.2d 18, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)
(holding that mere proof of a former marriage and the continued life of both spouses
is not sufficient to show the invalidity of the second marriage, and there must be a
further showing that the first marriage has not been set aside by judicial decree).
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C. How the Presumption Is Applied to
Formal and Informal Marriages
Although all American states recognize the validity of formal ceremonial
marriages,73 only twelve jurisdictions also recognize the validity of informal
common law marriages if contracted within that state.74 All that is required
for a valid common law marriage is a present intent and agreement of the
parties to enter into a matrimonial relationship, and in the absence of any
express evidence of this present intent and agreement, most courts will infer
such intent and agreement through cohabitation and community repute as
husband and wife.75 Moreover, even though the vast majority of American
states do not recognize common law marriages if contracted within their own
state, they will nevertheless recognize common law marriages if contracted
in one of the jurisdictions that do legally recognize common law marriages.76
The rationale for this recognition of sister state common law marriages is the
doctrine that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere unless it
is in violation of a state's strong public policy. 77 Furthermore, common law
marriages which validate the present marital expectations of the parties do
not generally violate a sister state's strong public policy which is to promote
and protect marriages in general.78
Although some courts have held that the party claiming a common law
marriage must have resided in or must have established a significant relation-
ship with the common law marriage state,79 other courts have held that visits
of short duration to a common law marriage state, where the parties held
themselves out as husband and wife, would suffice to create a legally valid
common law marriage. 8° This latter view is a better reasoned approach since
it validates the reasonable marital expectations of the parties and reaffirms
state public policy of promoting and protecting marriages in general.8
73. See generally CLARK, supra note 1, at 21-44, and UNDERSTANDING FAMILY
LAW, supra note 1, at 25-27.
74. The following jurisdictions still recognize common law marriage if contracted
within that state: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Texas, and the District of Columbia.
75. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 559 So. 2d 1084 (Ala. 1990); In re Estate of
Fischer, 176 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1970). See generally Stuart J. Stein, Common Law
Marriage: Its History and Certain Contemporary Problems 9 J. FAM. L. 271 (1969);
J.C. Hall, Common Law Marriage, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 106 (1987).
76. See, e.g., Michelli v. Michelli, 527 So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Brack v. Brack, 329 N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283(2) (1971).
78. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Holding, 293 F. Supp. 854 (E.D.
Va. 1968). See generally CLARK, supra note 1, at 45-62.
79. See, e.g., Hesington v. Estate of Hesington, 640 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Kennedy v. Damron, 268 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1954).
80. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Holding, 293 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1968).
81. See generally UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 1, at 27-29.
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How then does the last-in-time marriage presumption apply in a situation
involving both a formal statutory marriage and an informal common law mar-
riage? A majority of courts do not distinguish between formal ceremonial
marriages and informal common law marriages for purposes of recognizing
the last-in-time marriage presumption. Thus, the presumption would apply
regardless of whether the earlier, the later, or both marriages were common
12law marriages.
There is, however, also a questionable minority view where some courts
have expressed doubt as to whether the last-in-time marriage presumption
should apply to a common law marriage. For example, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court queried whether the presumption would arise when the subse-
quent marriage was a common law marriage, stating, "Granting that there
is a presumption, upon a second marriage, that a prior marriage has been
dissolved, a serious question arises as to whether such a presumption arises
in cases where the second marriage is a so-called common law marriage. " 83
Nevertheless, the court held that assuming arguendo "such a presumption
82. See, e.g., Welch v. All Persons, 254 P. 179, 182 (Mont. 1927) ("Every
presumption will be indulged in favor of the legality of a common law marriage in
the same way and to the same extent as the law indulges them in favor of a ceremonial
marriage."). See also Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 320 (Ala. 1985); Warner v.
Warner, 283 P.2d 931, 935 (Idaho 1955); Hill v. Shreve, 448 P.2d 848, 851 (Okla.
1968); Troxel v. Jones, 322 S.W.2d 251, 256-57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958); Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n v. Elder, 282 S.W.2d 371, 374-75 (Tex. 1955). See also In re
Estate of Benjamin, 355 N.Y.S.2d 356, 359 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that cohabitation
and community repute raise the presumption of a common law marriage, but such a
prior marriage yields to the stronger presumption attaching to a subsequent ceremonial
marriage).
83. Brantley v. Skeens, 266 F.2d 447, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (citing as authority
DiGiovanni v. DiGiovannantonio, 233 F.2d 26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). The DiGiovanni
court opined: "It is true that, where a ceremonial marriage is established and it is
shown that one of the parties was previously married, in the absence of proof on the
point it is generally presumed that the previous marriage was dissolved by divorce or
death. It may be doubtful that any such presumption arises in respect to a later alleged
common law marriage", quoting from SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 288 n.9
(1950).
With all due respect to a fellow law professor, why shouldn't a valid common law
marriage be treated with as much respect as a valid ceremonial marriage-especially
if the subsequent common law marriage was validating the marital expectations of the
parties? To quote another prominent family law professor:
In short, most of the objections to common law marriage mistake its purpose.
As a doctrine it has little or no effect at the outset of the parties' relationship. It
comes into play after that relationship has existed for some time, for the purpose
of vindicating the parties' marital expectations. There are other legal devices
having the same purpose, but common law marriage plays an important part.
Without it there would be more injustice and suffering in the world than there
is with it. This is particularly true among those social and economic classes
who have not accepted middle class standards of marriage. Certainly American
marriage law should tolerate this much cultural diversity.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 60.
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exists in the case of a second and common law marriage," the appellant could
not prevail in this particular case, since the last-in-time marriage presumption
was found to be rebutted by the district court.4
D. Types of Legal Actions Where the Presumption
Might Arise
The last-in-time marriage presumption can be invoked in many types of
civil actions.85 The most common cases where the presumption arises normally
occur when one spouse of a subsequent marriage dies and the surviving spouse
attempts to bring a legal claim based upon one of the following actions:
(1) a personal injury action,86 (2) a wrongful death action,87 (3) a related
products liability claim,88 (4) an action involving life insurance benefits 9
or workers' compensation benefits, 9° or (5) a probate action involving the
decedent's will or intestate succession. 9' The presumption also has been in-
voked in annulment 92 and divorce93 actions and in actions involving the legiti-
macy of children.94
When a surviving spouse seeks payment under a social benefit program,
that spouse generally will be attempting to defend his or her claim for such
benefits against a governmental agency which has denied the claim based upon
In short, the dicta in both the Brantley and DiGiovanni cases is ill-reasoned and
unpersuasive, and a majority of courts have wisely refrained from adopting this ap-
proach.
84. Brantley, 266 F.2d at 453-454.
85. The last-in-time marriage presumption however is not recognized to benefit
a defendant in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 81 A.2d
602, 607 (Md. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that the last-in-time marriage presumption
applies only in civil cases and has no place in a defense relating to a bigamy prosecution).
See also People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal. 1956) (same holding).
The rationale for this rule precluding the last-in-time marriage presumption from
applying to bigamy prosecutions apparently is based upon state public policy and social
convenience: that the state should not have to search all the divorce records to negate
this civil presumption in a criminal law action. See, e.g., Fletcher v. State, 81 N.E.
1083 (Ind. 1907); Bennett v. State, 56 So. 777 (Miss. 1911).
86. See, e.g., Miller v. AMF Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 328 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1982).
87. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D.
Va. 1980).
88. See, e.g., Curry v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 577 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
89. See, e.g., DeRyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 S.E.2d 177 (Va. 1965).
90. See, e.g., Meade v. State Compensation Comm'r, 125 S.E.2d 771 (W.Va.
1962).
91. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pope, 517 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
92. See, e.g., Smiley v. Smiley, 448 S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1970); Leslie v. Leslie,
53 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
93. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 275 So. 2d 683 (Ala. Ct. App. 1973); Warner
v. Warner, 283 P.2d 931 (Idaho 1955).
94. See, e.g., Ladner v. Pigford, 103 So. 218 (Miss. 1925).
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a purported unlawful marriage or when a prior spouse has come forward to
challenge the subsequent spouse's right to those benefits. Examples of such
benefits that the surviving spouse might claim include military benefits,95 social
security benefits,96 and workers' compensation benefits. 97
Alternatively, a surviving spouse may have to defend his or her claim to
the decedent spouse's property devised or bequeathed under the decedent's
will or inherited by intestate succession.98 In such cases, a subsequent spouse
generally would be defending her claim against a prior spouse who has ap-
peared to seek a share of the proceeds. The subsequent spouse may be defending
her claim against interested third parties such as the decedent's children who
may allege that the subsequent spouse is ineligible to take any proceeds based
on the purported invalid second marriage.
Finally, the last-in-time marriage presumption has been invoked in cases
where the parties to the subsequent marriage are both alive and are involved
in a divorce proceeding. In such divorce actions, one spouse (typically the
wife) will fide for divorce and request spousal support and marital property
rights, and the other spouse (typically the husband) will counter that these
spousal support and marital property rights are unavailable since the subsequent
marriage was invalid and void. 99 In these divorce proceedings, the courts
generally have held that the last-in-time marriage presumption is still available
in favor of the innocent subsequent spouse, and the party claiming that the
subsequent marriage is invalid still must meet his strong burden of proof to
rebut that presumption. "o
95. See, e.g., Munson v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 830 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Milano v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 586 F. Supp.
1431 (E.D. N.Y. 1984); Day v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 519 F. Supp.
872 (D.C. S.C. 1981); McKnight v. Schweiker, 516 F. Supp 1102 (D.C. Md. 1981).
97. See, e.g., Chandler v. Central Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649 (Kan. 1993); Courtlands
North Am. Inc. v. Lott, 403 So. 2d 240 (Ala. Ct. App. 1981).
98. See, e.g., Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1981); In re Estate of
Pope, 517 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Holloway v. Whitaker, 697 S.W.2d
551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Mayo v. Mayo, 326 S.E.2d 283 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985);
In re Estate of Perez, 470 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
99. See, e.g., Leonard v. Leonard, 560 So. 2d 1080 (Ala. Ct. App. 1990); Stewart
v. Hampton, 506 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987); Clark v. Clark, 719 S.W.2d 712
(Ark. Ct. App. 1986); Cann v. Cann, 632 A.2d 322 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1993).
100. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So. 2d 70, 72 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that the husband's testimony that he had never divorced his former wife was not enough
to overcome the last-in-time marriage presumption in favor of his subsequent wife
since the court would not allow the husband to void the subsequent marriage without
strong additional evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the second
marriage was legal and valid). See also Leonard v. Leonard, 560 So. 2d 1080, 1082-83
(Ala. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that husband's self-serving statements that his previous
marriage had not been dissolved were not enough to rebut the last-in-time marriage
presumption, since the husband had to search the appropriate court records where the
parties to the first marriage resided in order to prove that there was no divorce).
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IV. Burden of Proof
A. The Burden of Going Forward with the Evidence
Generally, the party claiming the validity of the last-in-time marriage must
demonstrate the existence of this subsequent marriage in order to invoke the
presumption. However, once the subsequent marriage is shown to exist, the
burden of proof then shifts to the party attacking the validity of the subsequent
marriage to prove the existence of a prior marriage and its continuing validity
at the time of the subsequent marriage.' 0 '
Two exceptions to this general rule are found in the questionable "Iowa
Doctrine," which unnecessarily requires additional proof of "inconsistent
marital conduct" on the part of both prior spouses and in the questionable
"California Rule," which purportedly shifts the burden of proof to the subse-
quent spouse once a prior spouse presents evidence of a valid former marriage.
For various reasons cited previously, both of these minority approaches are
unpersuasive and have not been adopted in the vast majority of states.
Once the last-in-time marriage presumption is invoked, the burden of proof
shifts to the party attacking the subsequent marriage to prove the existence
of a prior marriage and the continuation of the prior marriage at the time the
subsequent marriage was contracted. To successfully meet this burden of
proof, the attacking party must further prove that the prior marriage was not
dissolved either by death or divorce. This heavy burden of proof on the at-
tacking party therefore implicitly requires proving two negatives.l°2
B. Standard of Proof Required to Rebut
It is generally recognized that the last-in-time marriage presumption is a
rebuttable, not a conclusive, presumption. There is a split of authority, how-
101. See, e.g., Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 320 (Ala. 1985) (holding that
once a subsequent marriage is shown, the burden shifts to the attacking party to prove
its invalidity); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 314 S.E.2d 16, 18 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that once a subsequent marriage is shown to exist, the person attacking it has
the burden to show its invalidity).
102. See, e.g., Panzer v. Panzer, 528 P.2d 888, 892 (N.M. 1974):
The authorities which we consider to be sound require proof of the prior marriage
plus the fact that it has not been terminated by death or divorce .... "To overcome
the prima facie case established by the showing of a subsequent marriage, proof
of a former marriage is required, and also evidence from which it may be concluded
that it has not been dissolved by death or divorce." It is generally recognized
that in many fact situations these elements place a heavy, sometimes an impossible,
burden on the attacker to prove two negatives-no death and no divorce. This is
especially true in mobile societies with transitory marital relationships. Neverthe-
less, we approve these requirements. See also Clark v. Clark, 719 S.W.2d 712,
714 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) ("The presumptions of divorce from or death of a
previous spouse are so strong that they exist despite the fact that overcoming
them involves proof of a negative, ie. proof of no divorce and/or proof that the
previous spouse is still living.").
HeinOnline  -- 29 Fam. L.Q. 430 1995-1996
The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption 431
ever, as to the strength of the last-in-time marriage presumption.'0 3 Most courts
appear to require some form of a clear and convincing evidence standard to
rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption, but this is a difficult generalization
to make because the courts often use unnecessarily confusing and conflicting
terminology when describing this standard of proof.
Some courts expressly hold that the evidence presented must be clear and
convincing in order to rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption. 104 A simi-
lar, but not identical, standard of proof has been utilized by the Florida courts.
To meet the burden of rebutting the last-in-time marriage presumption under
Florida law, the party attacking the validity of the later marriage is not required
"to eliminate every remote possibility" but only to tender evidence "which
when weighed collectively establishes the absence of reasonable probability"
that a divorce was actually secured.105 It is unclear whether this Florida standard
of proof rises to the level of requiring clear and convincing evidence, but it
does approximate the general rule.
Other courts have been more equivocal regarding the standard of proof
required to rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption. The Kansas Supreme
Court, for example, stated that "every reasonable possibility of validity must
be negatived, and the evidence to overcome the presumption of validity of
the subsequent marriage must be clear, strong, and satisfactory and so persua-
sive as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."' 0 6 A Texas court similarly
held that the presumption "must prevail until rebutted by evidence which
negatives the effective operation of every possible means by which a dissolution
of the prior marriage could have taken place";'0 7 however, the invalidity of
a later marriage under Texas law need not be proven "absolutely or to a moral
certainty."'1 08
103. See, e.g., Rainer v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666, 668-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)
("[T]he difference of opinion relates to the quantum of proof required to rebut the
presumption. Thus, the proof necessary to rebut varies [among jurisdictions] from
positive proof, that is proof precluding any other result, to proof raising a reasonable
inference that the first marriage was not dissolved.").
104. See, e.g., Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1286 (1lth Cir. 1983); In re
Estate of Williams, 417 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Schall v. Schall,
642 P.2d 1124, 1126 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). See also Newberg v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d
1031, 1035 (N.J. 1982) (holding that the "challenger must disprove every reasonable
possibility that vitiates the prior marriage.").
105. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 384 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
See also In re Estate of Perez, 470 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
106. See, e.g., Chandler v. Central Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Kan. 1993).
See also Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1035 (N.J. 1982) (stating that the
challenger "must disprove every reasonable possibility that vitiates the marriage").
107. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Elder, 274 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1954).
108. See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 380 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1964). But see also a rather extreme minority holding of the Maryland courts, which
have articulated a standard of proof requiring evidence rebutting the last-in-time mar-
riage presumption to be sufficient so as to amount to a "moral certainty" in order to
overcome the presumption. See, e.g., McKnight v. Schwieker, 516 F. Supp. 1102,
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Finally, the Virginia courts apparently have adopted a less stringent standard
than clear and convincing evidence; however, the Virginia test is similar to
that of the Kansas and Texas courts. In practice, the Virginia test approximates
a clear and convincing evidence test. For example, in the case of DeRyder
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,109 the Virginia Supreme Court stated:
The cases are not entirely in harmony as to the force and effect to be given
to the presumption in favor of the validity of the second marriage. Generally,
it is said to be a strong presumption but one that may be rebutted by evidence
of invalidating facts. . . .[Miany cases are cited to support the statement
that in order to overcome the presumption of validity "the evidence must
be strong, distinct, satisfactory, and conclusive." A less stringent and,
as we think, a more logical and better supported rule is this ...... The
presumption arising in favor of the validity of a second marriage is not a
conclusive presumption, but is what is known as a rebuttable presumption,
and the one contending against the legality of the second marriage is not
required to make plenary proof of a negative averment. It is enough that
he introduces such evidence as, in the absence of all counter testimony,
will afford reasonable grounds for presuming that the allegation is true,
and when it is done the onus probandi will be thrown on his adversary. "0
These apparent inconsistencies in the standard of proof necessary to rebut
the last-in-time marriage presumption might initially appear to prohibit the
articulation of a predominant or overarching rule that would please jurists,
law professors, and practitioners alike. However, these standard of proof
variations in actuality are more apparent than real since once a former spouse
is shown to be alive, the vast majority of courts then require that the party
attacking the validity of the subsequent marriage affirmatively make a search of
the divorce records where the decedent spouse resided-or where the decedent
spouse reasonably could have resided-in order to rebut the last-in-time mar-
riage presumption, regardless of the purported standard of proof that a particu-
lar court might enunciate."'
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that although the presump-
1105 (D.C. Md. 1981). This Maryland standard of proof to rebut the last-in-time
marriage presumption appears to be the most stringent standard, by requiring a quantum
of proof greater than that of a clear and convincing standard.
109. 145 S.E.2d 177 (Va. 1965).
110. Id. at 181. See also Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp.
1358 (E.D. Va. 1980) and Parker v. Am. Lumber Corp., 56 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1949).
Arguably, Illinois has also adopted this standard. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41,
45 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying Illinois law).
111. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 74; and UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra
note 1, at 35-36. See, e.g., Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316 (Ala. 1985); Cole v.
Cole, 462 S.W.2d 213 (Ark. 1971); Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); Henderson v. Finch, 300 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. La. 1969); Schall v.
Schall, 642 P.2d 1124 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 204
P. 284 (Okla. 1921); Dixon v. Gardner, 302 F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Davis
v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975); Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490
F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1981); In re Graul's Estate, 425 P.2d 644 (Wash. 1967).
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tion of the validity of a subsequent marriage is "one of the strongest in our
law," nevertheless the presumption was rebutted by the former wife's search
of the divorce records in Lee County, Arkansas, where the decedent husband
has lived "nearly all his life."" 2 Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court found
that the last-in-time marriage presumption was successfully rebutted by the
former wife through evidence that a search of the legal records in two Texas
counties and a search of the records in Queensland, Australia, and Singapore
showed there was no divorce by the decedent husband. "3 The Texas Supreme
Court went on to state:
It is not necessary in order to rebut the presumption that Mary Nell prove
the nonexistence of divorce in every jurisdiction where proceedings could
have been possible; it is only necessary to rule out those proceedings where
Charles might reasonably have been expected to have pursued them. '14
Finally, the Virginia Supreme Court-a state court that purportedly applies
a "less stringent" standard of proof in rebutting the last-in-time marriage
presumption-nevertheless also applies this same practical test. For example,
in the case of DeRyder v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., "5 the former wife
attempted to rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption by demonstrating
that a search of the divorce records in Orange County, New York, and in
Norfolk, Hampton, and Elizabeth Counties, Virginia, where the decedent
husband had resided, showed no record of a divorce. The Virginia Supreme
Court, however, found that the husband was also stationed at Camp Peary
with the Navy Seabees in 1942 in York County, Virginia, and therefore since
the former wife had not searched the divorce records in York County, James
City County, or Williamsburg, Virginia, where the husband might also have
obtained a divorce, the last-in-time marriage presumption had not been re-
butted. 6
Thus, no matter what standard of proof the various courts have enunciated to
rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption, a practical application of rebutting
proof in the vast majority of states still requires that the former spouse search
the divorce records where the deceased spouse resided or reasonably could
have resided in order to successfully rebut the presumption.' '
Other courts, however, do not always follow this general rule when circum-
112. Cole v. Cole, 462 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Ark. 1971).
113. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1975).
114. Id. at 605.
115. 145 S.E.2d 177 (Va. 1965).
116. Id. at 182. See also Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 204 P. 284 (Okla. 1921).
117. See, e.g., Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 321 (Ala. 1985) (stating that
searches should be made of court records in all places where the first marriage partners
are shown to have resided); Schall v. Schall, 642 P.2d 1124, 1127 (N.M. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that the presumption was not rebutted because the decedent travelled
extensively during a ten-year interval between separation and remarriage, and that a
search of New Mexico legal records was therefore insufficient to establish that the
decedent did not obtain a divorce elsewhere). See also Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d
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stances exist which enable the court to conclude that no divorce was obtained
through alternative evidence and without an extensive search of the divorce
records. For example, a Florida appellate court, although recognizing that a
majority of courts do require the production of "no divorce" certificates from
every jurisdiction where the former spouse resided, nevertheless held that none
of these cases precluded a negation of the last-in-time marriage presumption by
other kinds of proof as well."' The court held that the decedent husband had
travelled so extensively that it would be manifestly unfair to require the former
wife to produce divorce records from every place he had ever visited. The
court held that the last-in-time marriage presumption was rebutted because
the former wife had established a "reasonable probability" that the decedent
husband never obtained a divorce by producing evidence that no divorce was
obtained in any location where the decedent had primarily resided, including
Florida, Texas, and Cuba." 9
The Michigan appellate court in In re Estate of Pope12 ° also held that the
last-in-time marriage presumption could be rebutted by evidence of circum-
stances surrounding the initial marriage and remarriage without involving an
extensive search of the divorce records. In Pope, the decedent husband had
married two women, had lived openly with both of them, had received mail
at both houses, and had filed two complaints for divorce but had never followed
through on either one of them. Additionally, the subsequent wife testified that
she telephoned and met with the former wife at the decedent's residence prior
to the second marriage. The court held that the last-in-time marriage presump-
tion was rebutted under these circumstances without a search of any divorce
records. 121
In conclusion, evidence that will rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption
normally requires that the attacking party must search the divorce records in
all the locations where the other spouse might reasonably have pursued the
action. In the alternative, the last-in-time marriage presumption also may be
rebutted by evidence of circumstances surrounding the initial marriage and
remarriage without making an exhaustive search of the divorce records, as
long as the attacking party's evidence meets the particular state's standard of
proof requirement to rebut the presumption.
1284 (11 th Cir. 1983) (where the court emphasized that, to the extent possible, available
public records should be exhausted to show the lack of any divorce. The court mentioned
that state Bureaus of Vital Statistics were potential sources of information since these
agencies are able to provide information as to whether or not a party obtained a divorce
anywhere in the state, without necessitating a county by county search. Because the
defendant in this particular case failed to produce certificates of search from the agencies
in all the states where the decedent spouse may have obtained a divorce, the court
found that the last-in-time marriage presumption had not been rebutted). Id. at 1288.
118. In re Estate of Perez, 470 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
119. Id. at 51.
120. 517 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
121. Id. at 282, 283.
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V. An Illustration:
Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
The case of Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. '22 is used as an illustrative
judicial decision analyzing and applying the last-in-time marriage presumption
for two reasons. First, the multifaceted and complex legal and factual issues
involved in the Hewitt case have resulted in this particular legal opinion being
cited as an illustrative decision in at least two family law casebooks. 2 3 Second,
one of this article's authors was an attorney of record in the Hewitt case, who
is able to offer supplemental analysis of this particular legal dispute. 12 4
A. The Facts of the Case
In June of 1966 John Carthel Hewitt, a twenty year old soldier in the United
States Army, married Barbara Cullum Hewitt, also twenty, in Texas. John
and Barbara resided together as husband and wife until 1969, with the exception
of John's two tours of duty in South Vietnam. John and Barbara lived together
in Maryland and Texas until September of 1969, when John suddenly deserted
his wife Barbara and their son John Carthel Hewitt, Jr. At the time of John's
desertion, Barbara was pregnant with their second child, Larry Dwayne Hew-
itt, who was subsequently born on March 3, 1970. "5
Barbara next heard from John in December of 1969 when he telephoned
from an undisclosed location. In this telephone conversation, John stated that
he cared for Barbara but that he would not return home. He also told Barbara,
falsely, that financial support would be forthcoming. The last time Barbara
allegedly talked to John was in August of 1973 when the parties discussed a
divorce. In the course of this telephone conversation, according to Barbara,
John assented to a divorce and allegedly told Barbara to have a lawyer "draw
up the papers" and send them to him. He said he would sign the papers and
return them to the lawyer with his fee. Barbara stated that she saw a lawyer
in Paris, Texas, that the lawyer drafted the pleadings and mailed them to John,
but that John never returned either the papers or the fee. Barbara could not recall
the name or location of the office of the attorney she purportedly visited. 12 6
Meanwhile, in October of 1969, John had met Nancy Anne Threatt in
Aberdeen, Maryland. On December 26, 1969, after a brief courtship, John and
Nancy were married in Fayetteville, North Carolina, at the home of Nancy's
122. 490 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1980) (applying Va. law) [hereinafter Hewitt].
123. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & CAROL GLOWINSKY, DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 115 (4th ed. 1990); and PETER N. SWISHER ET AL.,
FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 197 (1990).
124. Professor Swisher was the attorney of record for Nancy Anne Hewitt, the
last-in-time wife. Seven other law firms were also involved in this case. The Hewitt
case also served as a catalyst for one other legal endeavor. See PETER N. SWISHER,
VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS (1985).
125. Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1359-1360.
126. Id. at 1360.
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parents. Nancy and her parents were aware of John's previous marriage to
Barbara and his child, John, Jr. John, however, represented to Nancy and
her family that his first marriage to Barbara had ended in divorce. Nancy thus
married John in good faith, unaware of any legal impediment that prohibited
John from entering a second marriage. John and Nancy lived together continu-
ously as husband and wife for the next eight years until John's death. They
lived first in Aberdeen, Maryland, then in Hopewell, Virginia, and finally in
North Carolina. John and Nancy had three children, and John provided for
this family out of his earnings as an over-the-road truck driver.'27
On November 17, 1977, John Carthel Hewitt was killed when his tractor-
trailer truck left the road and overturned near Woodbridge, Virginia. At the
time of his death, John Hewitt was thirty-one years old, in good health, and
gainfully employed as a truck driver by the Great Coastal Transport Corpora-
tion, a trucking company located in Richmond, Virginia.'28
Barbara Hewitt learned about John's death through relatives and immedi-
ately, within a month, filed an application for social security benefits as John's
widow. Cognizant of John's later marriage to Nancy Hewitt, the Social Secu-
rity Administration sought information as to the existence of a divorce decree
dissolving the marriage of John and Barbara Hewitt. No decree was located,
and on this basis, the Social Security Administration awarded widow's, as
well as surviving children's benefits, to Barbara Hewitt and her family.1
29
In March of 1979, a products liability action for the wrongful death of
John Carthel Hewitt was commenced against the Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
based upon an allegedly defective truck tire that was manufactured and sold
by Firestone and that allegedly caused the death of John Carthel Hewitt. The
complaint was filed by Nancy Anne Hewitt and Jerome Lonnes as co-
administrators of the Estate of John Carthel Hewitt. After extensive discovery
and negotiations, the parties reached a settlement, and pursuant to Virginia
statutory law, 130 the parties tendered the terms of the settlement to the court
for its approval. Under this settlement, the defendant Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company, while denying any liability, agreed to pay $400,000 to the adminis-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1361. Additional facts presented at trial were that at the time of the
accident John Carthel Hewitt had an excellent safety record as a truck driver, the
weather was clear, and the road and road conditions were excellent. The proximate
cause of John's death was alleged to be a defective truck tire manufactured and sold
by the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. See Plaintiffs Complaint, at 1-2, Hewitt
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1979) (No. 79-0267-R).
129. Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1361. Appended to post-trial briefs submitted on
Barbara's behalf were photostats of documents from the Social Security Administration
indicating that searches conducted in various localities-including parts of Texas, North
Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey-failed to uncover any record of a divorce between
John and Barbara Hewitt. Id. at 1363 n. 11.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-55 (Michie 1982).
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trators for a release of all claims against Firestone arising from the death of
John Carthel Hewitt.1
3 1
Counsel for the co-administrators then learned about John Hewitt's earlier
marriage to Barbara and his children by that marriage when legal counsel
representing Barbara Hewitt became involved in this lawsuit. Advised that
there were conflicting claimants to the settlement proceedings, Judge D.
Dortch Warriner appointed guardians ad litem for the two sets of children
and set the matter for a hearing to determine the rightful beneficiaries. 1
31
The $400,000 settlement that was previously placed in the registry of the
court was deposited into an interest-bearing account. Since there was now a
possible conflict of interests between the estate of John Carthel Hewitt and
Nancy Anne Hewitt, Nancy obtained independent legal counsel to represent
her individual interests. The parties then sought a judicial determination of
the rightful beneficiaries and how the settlement funds should be distributed. 133
The judge requested supporting memoranda of law from legal counsel for
Nancy Anne Hewitt and legal counsel for Barbara Hewitt.
B. The Legal Issues Presented
Counsel for Nancy Anne Hewitt in his initial Memorandum of Law in
Support of Nancy Hewitt' 34 argued that Nancy Anne Hewitt was the legal wife
of John Carthel Hewitt based upon the last-in-time marriage presumption,
35
131. Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1361.
132. Id. at 1361. At that time, none of the parties, their legal counsel, nor thejudge
was aware of the existence of any legal presumption favoring the last-in-time marriage,
and the conventional thinking of the parties was that Barbara Hewitt might be the legal
wife of John C. Hewitt. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text. So when
counsel for the estate of John C. Hewitt initially approached counsel for Barbara Hewitt
to suggest a settlement between the respective wives, counsel for Barbara Hewitt
rejected the offer.
133. "In the case at bar two women, Barbara Hewitt and Nancy Hewitt, claim to
be the surviving spouse of John Carthel Hewitt. Both cannot be. See Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-38.1 (Michie Supp. 1979)
(declaring bigamous marriages to be void ab initio). Accordingly, the Court must
determine which of the two claimants is the surviving spouse and the rightful benefi-
ciary." Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1361.
Virginia's Death by Wrongful Act statute, a direct descendent of Lord Campbell's
Act, provides that damages shall be distributed to "the surviving spouse . . . [and]
children of the deceased .. " VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-53 (Michie Supp. 1979).
"The classes of beneficiaries named in the statute are exclusive; a court is not at liberty
to consider additional or alternative beneficiaries." Id.
134. Memorandum of Law in Support of Nancy Anne Hewitt, Hewitt v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1979) (No. 79-0267-R).
135. "In Virginia, as in most jurisdictions, a presumption exists that a marriage
last-in-time is valid, and that any prior marriage was terminated by death or divorce."
Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1362.
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citing relevant Virginia authority on point,136 and arguing that Barbara Hewitt
had not effectively rebutted this strong presumption.
Counsel for Barbara Hewitt in their initial Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Barbara Hewitt 137 conceded that the last-in-time marriage presump-
tion was recognized under Virginia law. Counsel for Barbara Hewitt argued,
however, that this presumption had been successfully rebutted since: (1)
Virginia law recognizes the so-called "California Rule," 138 so once Barbara
Hewitt establishes evidence of her prior marriage to John C. Hewitt, the
burden of proof then shifted to Nancy Anne Hewitt; 139 (2) the search by
the Social Security Administration of the divorce records in parts of Texas,
North Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey had located no divorce decree
for John Carthel Hewitt;' 40 and (3) John Carthel Hewitt allegedly had dis-
cussed the possibility of divorce with Barbara Hewitt over the telephone
in 1973, so John could not possibly have been divorced from Barbara in
1969 when he married Nancy Anne Hewitt.
14
'
In his Reply Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Memorandum of
Law in Support of Barbara Hewitt, 142 counsel for Nancy Anne Hewitt countered
that: (1) Virginia does not recognize the minority "California Rule,' 143 and
therefore the decision of Woolery v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., that
counsel for Barbara Hewitt cited as authority, was misinterpreted and misap-
plied by another coordinate federal district courtjudge;' 44 (2) theSocialSecu-
rity Administration records which were attached to Barbara Hewitt's Memo-
136. Counsel for Nancy Anne Hewitt cited as mandatory Virginia authority DeRyder
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 145 S.E.2d 177, 181 (Va. 1965), and Parker v.
American Lumber Corp., 56 S.E.2d 214, 216 (Va. 1949). Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 7
(1950) was also cited as persuasive authority.
137. Memorandum of Law in Support of Barbara Hewitt, Hewitt v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1979) (No. 79-0267-R) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Law in Support of Barbara Hewitt].
138. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
139. Counsel for Barbara Hewitt argued as authority the case of Woolery v. Metro.
Life Insurance Co., 406 F. Supp. 641, 644 (E.D. Va. 1976): "This presumption,
however, is simply a rule of evidence and may be rebutted by evidence sufficient to
overcome it. This burden is met if the evidence, in the light of all reasonable inferences,
shows that the first marriage was not dissolved or annulled. [citing as authority Tatum
v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957)]." Memorandum of Law in Support of Barbara
Hewitt, supra note 137, at 6.
140. This information was submitted to the court attached to the Memorandum of
Law in Support of Barbara Hewitt as "Exhibit I".
141. Memorandum of Law in Support of Barbara Hewitt, supra note 137, at 5-6.
142. Reply Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Memorandum of Law in
Support of Barbara Hewitt, Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp.
1358 (E.D. Va. 1979) (No. 79-0267-R) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum of Law].
143. Citing the strong burden of proof required in DeRyder v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 145 S.E.2d 177 (Va. 1965).
144. "As such, it is Nancy Anne Hewitt's contention, with all due respect, that
the court in Woolery v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 406 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.
Va. 1976-Alexandria Division) misinterpreted and misapplied the minority holding
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randum of Law as "Exhibit I" were not properly entered into evidence by
her legal counsel because they did not provide Nancy Anne Hewitt with any
due process right to cross-examination, 145 there was no identification as to
who actually prepared these records,'46 and the records, if they were admitted
into evidence, still failed to overcome Barbara Hewitt's burden of proof in
rebutting Nancy Anne Hewitt's last-in-time marriage since Barbara failed to
properly search the divorce records in all the places where John C. Hewitt
resided or reasonably could have resided; 147 and (3) there was no corroborat-
ing evidence as to the alleged 1973 telephone call made between John C.
Hewitt and Barbara Hewitt. 148
C. The Decision of the Court
In his judicial opinion dated June 10, 1980, Judge D. Dortch Warriner
found that Nancy Anne Hewitt was John C. Hewitt's surviving spouse since
Barbara Hewitt had failed to successfully rebut Nancy Anne Hewitt's last-in-
time marriage presumption.' 49 The judge gave several reasons for his decision:
[I]n Virginia the presumption in favor of the validity of the second or later
marriage is more than, as counsel for Barbara Hewitt contend, "simply a
rule of evidence". The strength of the presumption, which was emphasized
by the Court in DeRyder 5° necessitates that the evidence in rebuttal be itself
strong. The presumption, furthermore, is not one which disappears, or
"goes out the window" (to quote my law school Professor Nash), when
met with rebuttal evidence. Rather, it is a presumption that continues to
of Tatum v. Tatum since that holding is contrary to the established Virginia precedent
found in the Parker and DeRyder cases, supra." Reply Memorandum of Law, supra
note 174, at 3.
145. Citing as authority McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 34-36 (Edward W. Cleary et
al. eds., 1972) and FED. R. EVID. 701 and 703. Reply Memorandum of Law, supra
note 142, at 5-7.
146. Citing as persuasive authority Osmark v. American Can and Foundry Co.,
40 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1931) (holding that the testimony of an attorney alleging that
an unsuccessful search had been made for husband's divorce records was not admissible
in court in the absence of "the best proof" including "the testimony of the custodian
of those records."). Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 142, at 5. See also Smith
v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284 (11th Cir. 1983).
147. Nancy Anne Hewitt's prior "Statement of Claimant" stated under oath that
John Carthel Hewitt had also lived in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Havre de Grace,
Maryland, and Hopewell, Virginia after he separated from Barbara Hewitt. Conspicu-
ously missing from the Social Security records in "Exhibit I" was any indication of
a search for John C. Hewitt's divorce records made in either Kentucky, Virginia, or
other parts of Texas. Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 142, at 8-9.
148. Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 142, at 9-10.
149. Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1365.
150. DeRyder v. Metro. Life Insurance Co., 145 S.E.2d 177 (Va. 1965). The Court
in DeRyder specifically referred to the-presumption as a "strong presumption," 145
S.E.2d at 181, and required a search of the divorce records where the deceased husband
resided or could have resided. Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1364 n. 13 and 1365.
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have weight, due to the strength of the policies that give it purpose, 15 1 in
the face of contrary evidence. 152 The nature and the amount of evidence
that will provide reasonable grounds for finding that the first marriage has
not been dissolved will vary from case to case. As a rule, however, the
contesting party must attempt to document in every reasonable manner the
absence of a divorce .... The court does not suggest that it is incumbent
upon the party seeking to overcome the presumption of the validity of the
second marriage to document the absence of a divorce dissolving the first
marriage in every jurisdiction where a divorce could possibly have been
obtained. Were such a rule recognized in this day of divorce-on-demand
the presumption favoring the second marriage would not be rebuttable, but
effectively irrebuttable. The Virginia litigant seeking to negate the existence
of a divorce generally does have a burden, however, of showing that no
divorce was entered in jurisdictions where the parties resided or where on
any reasonable basis a decree might have been obtained. '
Thus, Judge Warriner refused to recognize the so-called "California Rule"
as enunciated in Woolery v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.I'
Next, Judge Warriner held that the Social Security Administration re-
cords, attached to Barbara Hewitt's Memorandum of Law as "Exhibit I,"
were inadmissable for a number of reasons.' 55 Therefore, counsel for Bar-
151. Here, Judge Warriner, in footnote 14 of his opinion, stated:
The presumptions supporting the validity of the second marriage arise "because
the law presumes morality and legitimacy, not immorality and bastardy." Parker
v. American Lumber Corp. 190 Va. 181, 195, 56 S.E.2d 214,216 (1949). Another
reason given for presuming the validity of the second marriage is that it is more
equitable to require the party attacking the second marriage to prove its invalidity
than to put the innocent party thereto to proof of the capacity of the other contracting
party. See Lampkin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 11 Colo. App. 249, 52 P. 1040 (1898).
Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1364.
152. Id. at 1364.
153. Id. at 1365.
154. 406 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Va. 1976). In footnote 12 of his opinion, Judge
Warriner stated:
In Woolery, Judge Lewis ruled that evidence of a prior marriage was sufficient
to rebut the presumption of the validity of a later marriage and to shift the burden
to the second wife of showing that the prior marriage had been terminated. 406
F. Supp. at 645. In so ruling, Judge Lewis rejected the contention of the last
wife that the prior wife, in order to overcome the presumption favoring the later
marriage, had an obligation to proffer some documentary evidence showing that
no divorce or annulment had been granted dissolving the prior marriage. Id. This
court is reluctant to reject the rationale of a coordinate court of the same jurisdic-
tion. Nonetheless, for the reasons advanced in the text of this opinion, this Court
believes that the Woolery decision is at variance with established Virginia law.
Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1364 n. 12.
155. In footnote 11 of his decision, Judge Warriner stated:
For several reasons, the Court must discount arguments based on the documents
of the Social Security Administration. First and foremost, the documents were
not introduced and have not been admitted in evidence. Although the Court ex-
presses no opinion about the admissibility of Social Security records, it is plain
HeinOnline  -- 29 Fam. L.Q. 440 1995-1996
The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption 441
bara Hewitt had "failed to come forward with any documentary evidence
from any jurisdiction which establishes that no divorce decree was entered
dissolving the marriage of John and Barbara Hewitt." 15 6 Third, Judge War-
riner rejected the claim of Barbara Hewitt's legal counsel that John could not
have obtained a divorce during the three months that lapsed from September
1969, when he left Barbara, to December 1969, when he married Nancy.
The judge stated:
This claim cannot be supported [since d]ivorce laws existing in the fifty
states in 1969 demonstrate that John could have obtained an exparte divorce
in at least six jurisdictions, including Texas. The possibility of a foreign
divorce, though not decisive here, also must be acknowledged. 1
57
Finally, Judge Warriner discounted Barbara Hewitt's testimony that John
C. Hewitt allegedly had telephoned Barbara in Texas in 1973 about a possible
divorce action, which would have been four years after his marriage to Nancy
Anne Hewitt:
Indeed, if the Court had evidence which would lend credibility to Barbara's
testimony about the 1973 phone call, the Court might conclude that the
presumption had been rebutted and the burden transferred [to Nancy Hew-
itt]. But no evidence is before the Court which corroborates Barbara's claim.
Barbara testified that she saw a lawyer about a divorce, and that he prepared
divorce papers. Barbara, however, is unable to remember the lawyer's
name, or the location of his office. She did not produce the papers or copies
of them. She had not re-contacted the lawyer for his corroborative evidence.
The Court cannot be persuaded by the uncorroborated, though easily corrob-
orated, testimony of interested witnesses who make claims that are practi-
cally incapable of contra-diction. 
5 8
to the Court that it would be unfair to consider the records now. Counsel for
Nancy Hewitt has had no opportunity to challenge the documents. Moreover,
even assuming the documents had been properly offered and admitted, the Court
would regard them-with nothing more-as unpersuasive. None of the information
contained in the records has been verified or authenticated. What is more, the
records themselves do not indicate that those who conducted the search were
qualified to conduct a competent search.
Hewitt, supra note 122, at 1363 n. 11.
156. Id. at 1363.
157. Id. at 1363 and 1316 at nn. 9 & 10.
158. Id. at 1362. In footnote 8 of his opinion, Judge Warriner further stated:
Barbara was living in Paris, Texas, a rural town located approximately one hundred
miles northeast of Dallas, when allegedly she saw an attorney about a divorce
from John. Assuming she called on a local attorney-an assumption that admittedly
may be inaccurate-the Court has difficulty understanding why that attorney can-
not be identified. Paris, Texas, presently supports but three law firms, consisting
of a total of seven lawyers. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DICTIONARY (1980).
If the bar of Paris has enjoyed any growth in recent years, one must accept that
the number of lawyers practicing there in 1973 was small indeed, and that the
names of those lawyers are readily ascertainable.
Id.
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Thus, at least two significant evidentiary facts that might have rebutted the
last-in-time marriage presumption in this particular case were not properly
submitted into evidence nor were they properly corroborated. Counsel for
Barbara Hewitt therefore could not rebut the last-in-time marriage presump-
tion, and accordingly Nancy Anne Hewitt was found by the court to be the
surviving spouse of John Carthel Hewitt and his beneficiary under Virginia's
Wrongful Death Act.
D. Post-Trial Motions, Appeal, and Settlement
Counsel for Barbara Hewitt then made a Motion for Relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) based upon "mistake, inadvertence, and excus-
able neglect," 15 9 arguing that counsel for Barbara Hewitt was materially and
prejudicially "surprised" when counsel for Nancy Hewitt raised the last-in-
time marriage presumption and based upon "newly discovered evidence
'6
in the form of a newly made-and corroborated-search of the divorce records.
Counsel for Nancy Anne Hewitt countered that there was no "surprise"
since counsel for Barbara Hewitt were fully informed of the last-in-time mar-
riage presumption in the initial Memorandum of Law in Support of Nancy
Anne Hewitt, and since in their own subsequent Memorandum of Law in
Support of Barbara Hewitt they conceded that counsel for Nancy Anne Hewitt
"correctly stated the law" regarding the last-in-time marriage presumption.
Consequently, there could be no "surprise," "mistake," or "excusable ne-
glect." The motion was denied.
161
Counsel for Barbara Hewitt also attempted to admit "newly discovered
evidence" pertaining to a corroborated search of the divorce records in order
to rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption and evidence of attorney consul-
tation in Paris, Texas. Counsel for Nancy Anne Hewitt countered that such
evidence was not "new," that it could have been discovered prior to trial
with due diligence, and that the case was thus res judicata. Judge Warriner
denied Barbara Hewitt's Motion on these grounds. 
62
159. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
160. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
161. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 576 (2d ed.
1993) ("Relief is allowed on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, or neglect only when
it appears to be reasonable under the circumstances and is not the result of gross
negligence on the part of the moving party or his lawyer. In practice, this means that
the rule most frequently is invoked successfully in the default setting or when the
plaintiffs suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute and judgment was entered by
mistake .... Outside the default setting, negligent errors of counsel are treated less
sympathetically and relief frequently is denied on the ground that the negligent act
was inexcusable.").
162. Id. ("Federal Rule 60(b)(2), authorizing relief on grounds of newly discovered
evidence, requires something more than simply the development of a new theory and
newly discovered facts. A party seeking to rely on this provision must show that the
evidence and the fact to which it relates were in existence at the time of trial, and that
the party was unable to discover them at that time despite the exercise of due diligence
in preparing the case.").
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After various other unsuccessful post-trial motions, counsel for Barbara
Hewitt then appealed the trial court decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.163 By this time, based upon a wise investment by the
clerk of the court of the initial $400,000 settlement proceeds in U.S. Treasury
Bonds, the total amount of the settlement now approximated $500,000. The
parties then agreed to a second court approved settlement, and they jointly
brought a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal in both the U.S. district court and
the U.S. court of appeals. Under the terms of this settlement, Nancy Anne
Hewitt and her children received $400,000, and Barbara Hewitt and her chil-
dren received $100,000.
VI. Conclusion
The last-in-time marriage presumption continues to serve an important legal
and societal function. Its underlying public policy bases are premised on pre-
suming the innocence and morality of the parties, protecting the legitimacy of
their offspring, validating the reasonable marital expectations of the subsequent
spouses, and strengthening and stabilizing the social and moral standards of
the community. These interrelated factors remain strong and viable public
policy rationales for continuing to apply the last-in-time marriage presumption
in today's contemporary society.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions-with the notable exceptions of states
following the ill-reasoned "Iowa Doctrine" or the "California Rule'--the
last-in-time marriage presumption continues to be recognized as a strong,
though rebuttable, presumption. The courts appear to differ regarding the
evidentiary strength and standard of proof required to rebut the last-in-time
marriage presumption; however, in practice these differences are more appar-
ent than real since a large majority of states recognize that the attacking party
may only successfully rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption through a
search of the divorce records in those jurisdictions where the decedent spouse
resided or might reasonably have resided.
In the alternative, an attacking party also may present evidence of other
circumstances surrounding the initial marriage and remarriage without making
an exhaustive search of the divorce records as long as the attacking party's
evidence meets the state's particular standard of proof required to rebut the
last-in-time marriage presumption. The persuasiveness of such alternative evi-
dence normally is determined by the court on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, as illustrated in the case of Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company, it is crucially important that legal counsel for the former spouse
ensure that all significant evidence is properly submitted to the court, and is
properly corroborated, in order to rebut the last-in-time marriage presumption.
163. Barbara Hewitt v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Nancy Anne Hewitt and
Jerome L. Lonnes, Co-Administrators of the Estate of John Carthel Hewitt, Deceased
v. Nancy Anne Hewitt Civil Action No. 80-1871 (4th Cir. 1980).
HeinOnline  -- 29 Fam. L.Q. 443 1995-1996
